validate identity provider form fields before save by AndresTK89 · Pull Request #2816 · utmstack/UTMStack

AndresTK89 · 2026-10-01T21:40:35Z

feat(v12): validate identity provider form fields before save

The IdP create/edit form only checked presence and the backend only
checked format at login, so a mistyped URL, PEM or port reached a
signing user instead of the admin who typed it.

Add src/features/settings/lib/idp-form-validation.ts (pure, no React)
that returns one i18n key per bad field, and wire it into the
UpsertDialog: per-field red border + aria-invalid + message, and the
save button gated on it.

Rules per protocol:

name: required, <=64, no spaces (create only; the edit input is
disabled, so its format must not lock the form out of saving
anything else)
saml: metadataUrl + spAcsUrl are http(s); spEntityId is a URI
(http/https/urn) on create; certificate and private key must carry
PEM armour; secret required on create, optional on edit
oidc: issuer is https (discovery runs against it); redirectUrl is
https or an http loopback per RFC 8252 section 7.3; client secret
required on create
ldap: host is a hostname/IP without scheme; port is an integer
1-65535 (0 is the 389 default, not a mistype); userFilter must
contain %s and have balanced parentheses; bind password required
on create

Fix the LDAP port input: it stored Number(e.target.value), so a float
like 389.5 400'd on unmarshal to int. Now Math.trunc(...).

Sources cross-checked: OpenID Connect Core 1.0, RFC 8252 section 7.3,
SAML vendor guides (Cisco IPR, OneStream, Vendasta), and the backend's
own service-bind -> search -> user-bind flow in modules/iam/usecase/idp.go.

41 unit tests in idp-form-validation.test.ts, one per rule.
i18n keys under idp.form.errors.* in en/es/fr/de/it/pt/ru.

github-actions · 2026-10-01T22:11:53Z

🛑 AI review — Sensitive area, extra care recommended

This PR touches critical paths or introduces changes the model cannot judge with sufficient confidence. Review carefully before merging.

🛑 `architecture` (`silas-1.7-pro`) — high/critical — please review

Summary: Tier 3: IdP auth/secret handling changes, including a removed LDAP bind-password assignment and new save-time format validation that can affect existing deployments.

high backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp.go:158 — Removes s.BindPassword = kept after keepOrEncrypt, so the LDAP bind password may be persisted as the raw input or blank instead of the encrypted/kept value. Restore the assignment or make the secret-retention helper mutate the settings struct.
high backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp.go:94 — New save-time format validation for SAML/OIDC/LDAP can reject edits to legacy IdP configurations that were previously accepted. Validate only newly supplied fields or preserve prior values to avoid breaking existing deployments.
medium backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp.go:250 — New IdP name restriction changes the public upsert contract for creates. If clients may send legacy names, document the change or defer URL-safety validation to SSO route construction.
low frontend/src/features/settings/lib/idp-form-validation.ts:1 — Duplicated URL/PEM/loopback validation rules with backend idp_validation.go. Consider a shared contract, generated tests, or cross-language golden tests to prevent drift.
low backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp_validation.go:19 — validateIDPSettingsFormat appears unused in this diff. Remove it or wire it into the validation path to avoid dead code.

🛑 `bugs` (`silas-1.7-pro`) — high/critical — please review

Summary: Tier 2: LDAP bind password is not persisted after keepOrEncrypt; additional validation gaps for IPv6, whitespace, and edit name changes plus i18n/doc inconsistencies.

high backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp.go:158 — The LDAP case removed s.BindPassword = kept before json.Marshal(s). Create stores the plaintext input and edit stores blank, so the kept/encrypted bind password is lost and LDAP login breaks.
medium backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp_validation.go:62 — Validators trim values only for checking but prepareSettings stores the original untrimmed strings. A host or URL with leading/trailing spaces passes validation, is persisted, and can fail at login.
medium backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp_validation.go:16 — idpHostRe allows only [A-Za-z0-9.-]+, so valid IPv6 LDAP hosts such as ::1 or 2001:db8::1 are rejected.
medium frontend/src/features/settings/lib/idp-form-validation.ts:27 — HOST_RE uses [A-Za-z0-9.-]+ and rejects IPv6 hosts, so the form blocks valid LDAP IPv6 addresses.
medium backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp.go:250 — Name format is enforced only when previous == nil. If the edit API accepts a changed name, a non-URL-safe name can be persisted because the regex is skipped for existing providers.
low frontend/src/features/settings/lib/idp-form-validation.ts:130 — Missing parentheses around the right-hand ?? 0 makes the condition parse as (openCount !== closeCount) ?? 0; a filter with zero parentheses is flagged unbalanced.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/en.json:1348 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/de.json:1196 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/es.json:1196 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/fr.json:1196 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/it.json:1196 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/pt.json:1196 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/shared/i18n/locales/ru.json:1208 — Port error says between 1 and 65535, but validation and backend allow 0 as the default 389.
low frontend/src/features/settings/lib/idp-form-validation.md:16 — Doc says backend only checks presence on save, but this PR adds format validation in prepareSettings.

🛑 `security` (`silas-1.7-pro`) — high/critical — please review

Summary: LDAP IDP bind password can be stored in plaintext because the encrypted kept value is not assigned before marshaling settings.

high backend/modules/iam/usecase/idp.go:158 — In the LDAP case, s.BindPassword is not set to the result of keepOrEncrypt before json.Marshal(s). If a new bind password is supplied, the plaintext request value is persisted instead of the encrypted secret. Restore s.BindPassword = kept after the kept == "" check, matching SAML/OIDC handling.

🔴 `go-deps` — pending updates

🔍 Discovered 30 Go projects

📦 Dependencies with updates available:

  📁 ./plugins/gcp:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/aws:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/alerts:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/events:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/stats:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/rule-flood-guard:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/o365:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/playground:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/soc-ai:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/sophos:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/azure:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/crowdstrike:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/bitdefender:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/feeds:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/geolocation:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./plugins/soar:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.37-0.20261001164002-a596631a84c5 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./backend:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.27-0.20260819160318-c56c250bc585 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./tools/rulecheck:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.31 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./agent-manager:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.31 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./log-input:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.31 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./agent:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.28 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./collectors/utmstack:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.31 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./collectors/forwarder:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.31 → v1.1.37

  📁 ./collectors/as400:
     - github.com/threatwinds/go-sdk: v1.1.31 → v1.1.37

❌ Please update dependencies before merging.

…eld-validation

validate identity provider form fields before save

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AlexSanchez-bit linked an issue Oct 1, 2026 that may be closed by this pull request

identity providers form lacks of validation of fields #2799

Open

2 of 3 tasks

AlexSanchez-bit and others added 2 commits October 2, 2026 10:43

fix[backend](iam): added identity provider format validations

acf8300

Merge branch 'release/v12.0.0' into backlog/identity-provider-form-fi…

90b1398

…eld-validation

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validate identity provider form fields before save - #2816

validate identity provider form fields before save#2816
AndresTK89 wants to merge 3 commits into
release/v12.0.0from
backlog/identity-provider-form-field-validation

AndresTK89 commented Oct 1, 2026

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🛑 AI review — Sensitive area, extra care recommended

🛑 architecture (silas-1.7-pro) — high/critical — please review

🛑 bugs (silas-1.7-pro) — high/critical — please review

🛑 security (silas-1.7-pro) — high/critical — please review

🔴 go-deps — pending updates

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🛑 `architecture` (`silas-1.7-pro`) — high/critical — please review

🛑 `bugs` (`silas-1.7-pro`) — high/critical — please review

🛑 `security` (`silas-1.7-pro`) — high/critical — please review

🔴 `go-deps` — pending updates