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fix(admin): revoke the session token at logout, not only its cookie - #1145
POST /admin/logout cleared the browser cookie (Max-Age=0) but did nothing to the token. An admin session token was <expiresAt>.<HMAC(expiresAt)>, so it was valid for its whole lifetime (24 hours by default) and isRequestAuthenticated only checked the signature and the expiry. A copy of a token that outlived the sign-out, for example the value a Bearer client sends or one that ended up in a log or proxy, could restore administrator access after logout. The token also carried no unique id, so two logins in the same second produced the same token and one session could not be ended without the other.
the token is now <expiresAt>.<sessionId>.<signature>: sessionId is 16 random bytes in hex and is signed together with the expiry;
handleLogout records the session id in Redis (admin:session:revoked:<id>) until the token would have expired, then clears the cookie. Redis is the cache every worker already shares (the NIP-98 replay claim uses it the same way), so a logout handled by one worker ends the session on all of them;
isRequestAuthenticated is now async and refuses a token whose session id is recorded. The two admin middlewares await it;
if Redis cannot be read the token is refused (failing closed), and a logout that cannot record the id answers 500 and still clears the cookie, rather than reporting a sign-out that did not happen.
Upgrade effect: tokens issued before this change have no session id and are refused, so each administrator signs in once more. A token lasts 24 hours by default, so this costs one login.
CodeRabbit's scan reported this as F-021 (medium) without establishing reachability, so I checked the code first: handleLogout in src/admin/password-admin-auth-provider.ts only builds the clearing cookie, and isValidAdminSessionToken accepts any token with a good signature and a future expiry.
Motivation and Context
Signing out of the admin console should end the session, not only forget it in the browser. The fix keeps tokens stateless to verify (still HMAC-signed) and adds the smallest server-side state that makes logout real: a short-lived revocation entry per logged-out session.
How Has This Been Tested?
Unit tests, run with mocha:
test/unit/utils/admin-session.spec.ts: two tokens for the same expiry differ; the id is read back; an id or expiry changed under the same signature is refused; the old two-part token, a malformed id and extra parts are refused; an expired token is refused.
test/unit/utils/admin-session-revocations.spec.ts: the entry is keyed per session and kept for the remaining lifetime (at least one second); a cache failure is not hidden.
test/unit/admin/password-admin-auth-provider.spec.ts: a token issued by handleLogin authenticates, by cookie and by Bearer; after logout a retained copy is refused by both; another session stays logged in, including one issued in the same second; a second logout answers the same; no valid token revokes nothing; a failed revocation answers 500 and clears the cookie; an unreadable revocation list refuses the token.
test/unit/handlers/request-handlers/admin-auth-middleware.spec.ts: the provider stub is async now.
I removed the fix to check the tests catch it: without the revoked-check 5 fail, without the revoke at logout 6 fail, with a fixed session id 5 fail, and with the check failing open on a Redis error 1 fails.
pnpm lint, pnpm check:format, pnpm check:deps, pnpm run build:check, pnpm run build, pnpm run test:unit and pnpm run test:cli pass.
Screenshots (if appropriate):
Types of changes
Non-functional change (docs, style, minor refactor)
Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change)
Checklist:
My code follows the code style of this project.
My change requires a change to the documentation.
I have updated the documentation accordingly.
I have read the CONTRIBUTING document.
I have added tests to cover my code changes.
I added a changeset, or this is docs-only and I added an empty changeset.
All new and existing tests passed.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Admin sessions are revoked on logout, preventing reuse of the same session through a cookie or bearer token. Revocation is shared across application workers and lasts until the token expires.
Admin session tokens include a unique session identifier; older tokens without one are rejected.
Bug Fixes
If session revocation cannot be checked, admin authentication fails closed. If logout cannot record revocation, the cookie is cleared and an error is returned.
If logout fails or the request encounters a network error, the login screen warns that the server session may remain active until it expires.
No actionable comments were generated in the recent review.
Walkthrough
Admin session tokens now include unique, signed session IDs. Logout records valid session IDs in cache until token expiry. Admin authentication checks the cache and rejects revoked sessions. Logout and authentication operations now use asynchronous interfaces.
Changes: Admin session revocation
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Session tokens and revocation storage src/@types/admin.ts, src/utils/admin-session.ts, src/utils/admin-session-revocations.ts, test/unit/utils/admin-session.spec.ts, test/unit/utils/admin-session-revocations.spec.ts
Tokens include a random session ID in the signed data, and parsing returns the ID with the expiry. CacheAdminSessionRevocations stores session-specific cache entries with a validated TTL and operation timeout. Tests cover token parsing, signatures, cache keys, TTL handling, and cache errors.
Logout revokes a valid session and clears the cookie; a revocation error returns HTTP 500 and skips the audit hook. Authentication checks revocation and denies access if the check fails. The controller and middleware await these operations. The dashboard reports when logout fails. Tests cover logout, authentication, and route behavior; the changeset describes the changes.
cameri/nostream#1022 — The PR changes the logout flow named in the issue, but does not establish whether it fixes audit records for logout without a valid session.
cameri/nostream#1015 — The PR prevents reuse of a logged token after logout through cookie or Bearer authentication, but does not remove the reported header logging.
Merge Risk: Minimal · up to 47b18
Admin logout now revokes the session in shared storage and both cookie and Bearer tokens are checked, as the issue requested. Revocation read failures reject the token and logout write failures return an error. No merge-blocking risk was found. Administrators must sign in again after the upgrade.
Pre-merge checks: 4
Check name
Status
Explanation
Description Check
Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check
The title "fix(admin): revoke the session token at logout, not only its cookie" matches the main change. Logout now records the session ID in Redis until token expiry, and authentication rejects revok…
Linked Issues check
Issue #1016 is the only direct linked issue, and it is open. Its coding requirements are three: a unique session id, server-side invalidation on logout in shared storage, and a check of that state for…
Out of Scope Changes check
Each changed area traces to the #1016 objective:
- src/utils/admin-session.ts: session id generation, signing, and parsing. Core to the objective. - src/utils/admin-session-revocations.ts: cache-back…
Full details: Title check
Explanation
The title "fix(admin): revoke the session token at logout, not only its cookie" matches the main change. Logout now records the session ID in Redis until token expiry, and authentication rejects revoked tokens. The changeset also covers related work such as signed random session IDs and the 500 error path. The title names the primary behavior change and does not mention these details, which is acceptable.
Full details: Linked Issues check
Explanation
Issue #1016 is the only direct linked issue, and it is open. Its coding requirements are three: a unique session id, server-side invalidation on logout in shared storage, and a check of that state for cookie and Bearer credentials.
Unique session id [#1016]: The head code in src/utils/admin-session.ts adds a random 16-byte hex sessionId, signed with the expiry. parseAdminSessionToken returns sessionId and rejects malformed ids. Met.
Server-side invalidation in shared storage [#1016]: handleLogout in src/admin/password-admin-auth-provider.ts parses a valid token and calls sessionRevocations.revoke(session.sessionId, remainingSeconds + 1). CacheAdminSessionRevocations in src/utils/admin-session-revocations.ts writes admin:session:revoked:<id> to the shared cache with a TTL. Met.
Check for cookie and Bearer credentials [#1016]: isRequestAuthenticated reads the token through getToken, which covers the Authorization header and the cookie. It returns false when isRevoked is true. The summary states that both admin middlewares await this check. Met.
Fail-closed behaviour is present. A read failure in isRequestAuthenticated returns false. A failed revocation in handleLogout returns 500 and still clears the cookie.
Limits: The provider and revocation store were read at head. The middleware and test files were assessed from the change summary and the PR description, not re-read.
Full details: Out of Scope Changes check
Explanation
Each changed area traces to the #1016 objective:
src/utils/admin-session.ts: session id generation, signing, and parsing. Core to the objective.
src/utils/admin-session-revocations.ts: cache-backed revocation store with timeouts. Core to the objective.
src/@types/admin.ts and src/admin/password-admin-auth-provider.ts: IAdminSessionRevocations interface and async signatures. Required for the revocation check.
src/controllers/admin/post-logout-controller.ts and src/handlers/request-handlers/admin-auth-middleware.ts: await the now-async methods. Required by the async change.
resources/admin/assets/dashboard.js: reports the new logout failure path (500) to the operator. It supports the logout objective and does not change unrelated behaviour. The PR description does not mention this file. This omission does not make the change out of scope.
Tests under test/unit/... and .changeset/admin-session-logout-revocation.md: supporting tests and release note.
No change was found that is unrelated to #1016.
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A rabbit signs a token bright, With session IDs tucked out of sight. A logout marks that session done, Cache checks keep the next request from fun. If logout fails, the screen makes clear, The session may remain for a little year.
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Summary
Admin logout now revokes the supplied session in shared Redis before reporting success.
Admin logout now ends the matching session token across admin requests.
The admin page warns when sign-out cannot be confirmed.
Test fixtures keep the same behavior after rewrapping.
Diagram
sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant Admin
participant Redis
Client->>Admin: POST /admin/logout with token
Admin->>Admin: Check signature and expiry
Admin->>Redis: Record session ID until expiry
alt Record succeeds
Admin-->>Client: Clear cookie and return 200
else Error or timeout
Admin-->>Client: Clear cookie and return 500
end
Client->>Admin: Request with retained token
Admin->>Redis: Check session ID
Redis-->>Admin: Revoked
Admin-->>Client: Refuse access
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Actionable comments posted: 2
Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
Prompt to fix all issues
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @resources/admin/assets/dashboard.js:
- Line 1806: Update the sign-out failure message to state that sign-out is
unconfirmed when the server request fails; do not imply the browser has signed
out, since changing the interface does not clear the HttpOnly cookie.
- Line 1806: Update the sign-out failure message in the dashboard to warn that
the original server session may remain valid until it expires; remove the
instruction to sign in and sign out again.
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resources/admin/assets/dashboard.js
src/utils/admin-session-revocations.ts
test/unit/utils/admin-session-revocations.spec.ts
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Description
POST /admin/logoutcleared the browser cookie (Max-Age=0) but did nothing to the token. An admin session token was<expiresAt>.<HMAC(expiresAt)>, so it was valid for its whole lifetime (24 hours by default) andisRequestAuthenticatedonly checked the signature and the expiry. A copy of a token that outlived the sign-out, for example the value aBearerclient sends or one that ended up in a log or proxy, could restore administrator access after logout. The token also carried no unique id, so two logins in the same second produced the same token and one session could not be ended without the other.<expiresAt>.<sessionId>.<signature>:sessionIdis 16 random bytes in hex and is signed together with the expiry;handleLogoutrecords the session id in Redis (admin:session:revoked:<id>) until the token would have expired, then clears the cookie. Redis is the cache every worker already shares (the NIP-98 replay claim uses it the same way), so a logout handled by one worker ends the session on all of them;isRequestAuthenticatedis now async and refuses a token whose session id is recorded. The two admin middlewares await it;Upgrade effect: tokens issued before this change have no session id and are refused, so each administrator signs in once more. A token lasts 24 hours by default, so this costs one login.
Related Issue
Fixes #1016
CodeRabbit's scan reported this as F-021 (medium) without establishing reachability, so I checked the code first:
handleLogoutinsrc/admin/password-admin-auth-provider.tsonly builds the clearing cookie, andisValidAdminSessionTokenaccepts any token with a good signature and a future expiry.Motivation and Context
Signing out of the admin console should end the session, not only forget it in the browser. The fix keeps tokens stateless to verify (still HMAC-signed) and adds the smallest server-side state that makes logout real: a short-lived revocation entry per logged-out session.
How Has This Been Tested?
Unit tests, run with mocha:
test/unit/utils/admin-session.spec.ts: two tokens for the same expiry differ; the id is read back; an id or expiry changed under the same signature is refused; the old two-part token, a malformed id and extra parts are refused; an expired token is refused.test/unit/utils/admin-session-revocations.spec.ts: the entry is keyed per session and kept for the remaining lifetime (at least one second); a cache failure is not hidden.test/unit/admin/password-admin-auth-provider.spec.ts: a token issued byhandleLoginauthenticates, by cookie and byBearer; after logout a retained copy is refused by both; another session stays logged in, including one issued in the same second; a second logout answers the same; no valid token revokes nothing; a failed revocation answers 500 and clears the cookie; an unreadable revocation list refuses the token.test/unit/handlers/request-handlers/admin-auth-middleware.spec.ts: the provider stub is async now.I removed the fix to check the tests catch it: without the revoked-check 5 fail, without the revoke at logout 6 fail, with a fixed session id 5 fail, and with the check failing open on a Redis error 1 fails.
pnpm lint,pnpm check:format,pnpm check:deps,pnpm run build:check,pnpm run build,pnpm run test:unitandpnpm run test:clipass.Screenshots (if appropriate):
Types of changes
Checklist:
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes